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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BACK TO THE FUTURE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
REDISCOVERY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS—AND WRONGS

JUNE CARBONE*
Why Property? I first encountered this question when I applied for a job at
Santa Clara in the late eighties. I had been happily teaching Contracts at
George Mason in Arlington, Virginia, when my husband received a job offer in
San Francisco. Santa Clara had a tenure track opening in Property, and the
question was why did I want to switch courses. The short answer was I wanted
to be in the Bay area. I no longer remember the long answer. Not long after I
was hired, the issue changed to why teach Property in the first year. The short
answer at Santa Clara was the property emphasis on the California bar. I
remember having trouble with a longer answer. To someone who had recently
taught Contracts, Property seemed to be specialized agreements, with bits of
tort (nuisance) and public law (zoning and takings) thrown in. The most
distinctive parts of Property, estates in land, future interests and covenants,
used the connection to land to solve the third party problem in Contracts. As
Property professors moved landlord-tenant law earlier in the semester to make
the course more timely, and as land became a less critical component of
wealth, the justifications for including it in the first year at all became more
remote. When I interviewed at Santa Clara, what I didn’t say was that of all
the first year courses, Property was the one I knew the least about—I had never
even taken it in law school. No one at Santa Clara thought to ask, but Yale had
dropped it from the first-year curriculum well before I arrived. Property was in
danger of becoming a dinosaur.
I began writing this essay on the way back from the AALS Hiring
Conference in Washington, D.C. We have an opening for entry level faculty in
first-year courses, and no real preference by subject matter. A substantial
number of the candidates we interviewed volunteered that they would like to
teach Property, and their enthusiasm was genuine. One young man went on at
great length about how intellectually stimulating property was as opposed to
the areas like civil procedure that he knew more about. I have even had

* Professor of Law and Presidential Professor of Ethics and the Common Good, Santa Clara
University. I would like to thank Margalynne Armstrong, Carol Rose and Joe Singer for their
suggestions during earlier stages in the development of this Essay and to Rosa Tsongtaatarii and
Kara Koerner for their research assistance. Any errors, however, are my own.
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students ask me to organize an upper class seminar on property theory. It’s
been over a decade since I’ve thought about switching back to Contracts.
Property is back to a respected place in the law school canon.
What has brought Property back from the brink of first year extinction is
the continuing importance of what a Stanford professor described to me as “the
thingness of it.” The classic account of Property’s distinctiveness is that the
legal relationships between people included in the course—those between
neighbors, landlords and tenants, testators and devises, sellers and buyers,
losers and finders—are mediated by their relationship to a thing. When the
“thing” is important, or the allocation of rights uncertain, Property becomes the
stuff of struggle, philosophy and the first year introduction to law. When the
allocation of rights becomes so settled that the course focus shifts too
completely to their colorfully trivial acquisition (the fox hunt?) or their
mindnumbingly complex division (the welter of land use regulations), property
as a unified and distinctive concept loses its way. Joe Singer writes in this
Issue that he has reorganized his property course to emphasize the intermediate
transactions—the governance, sharing and division of property rights—that
make up lawyers’ most frequent encounters with property law. I believe that
Singer’s reconstruction of the course was right. It captures the most distinctive
part of the subject at the time I started teaching it. It misses, however, the
questions that the new generation of faculty candidates and our students are
increasingly asking: Is property theft? Are property rights fixed? What
interests do they serve? What alternatives are possible? Singer’s emphasis on
transactions often addresses these issues in the midst of established property
regimes; I believe that now is the time to reconsider how we address them in
the construction of the regime—and at the beginning of the first year.
In the first decade of the new millenium it is the allocation of property
rights and the creation of a structure for governance that is again engaging the
legal imagination. My introduction to property rights came when Curtis
Berger started the college land use course I took by asking to borrow a
student’s watch, and then spending the rest of the class asking us to justify the
student’s right to have it returned. The classic property introductions with their
lines of cases on wild animals and finders were designed to introduce students
to the case method and to remind them that the allocation of rights in things
should be questioned, but then quickly resolved into an established, if not
always entirely determinate, order. My colleagues at Santa Clara and I have
revised the classic materials to provide a more thorough introduction to
intellectual property and to the raging controversies over the extension of
property rights to images, ideas, body parts and fertilized eggs. Dorothy
Glancy, who also teaches an upper level intellectual property class, developed
the materials.
Margalynne Armstrong, Cynthia Mertens and I have
incorporated them into our first-year courses. We have selectively replaced the
cases on wild animals, finders and bailment with these new materials that
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examine the emerging property regimes that govern information, identity, cells
and progeny. The result is a reinvigorated course that more thoroughly
examines the question “what is property,” and how the allocation of property
rights governs new technologies and the relationships between those involved.
In this Essay, I intend to examine these materials, and explain how they
frame the way we teach the rest of course. I will emphasize, first, how we use
Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Native
American land rights case that now opens many property texts, to
introduce the idea that property regimes are legal constructs, chosen rather than
ordained within particular contexts. Second, I will examine the messages that
come out of the wild animal cases and compare them to the similar conclusions
that come from INS v. AP., Bette Midler and Vanna White. Third, I will
discuss Moore and Hecht, and the contrasting ideas of property and contract.
Finally, I will end with the frozen embryos cases and Shack, and the idea that
public policy, sometimes, but not always trumps the allocation of private
interests.
I. IN THE BEGINNING: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE SOURCES OF AMERICAN LAW
Johnson v. M’Intosh1 is the ideal case for our multicultural, globalized
times. A rich and powerful civilization is in a position to dictate the property
regime for an inhabited continent it has recently discovered. The two cultures
have radically different approaches to the allocation of real property rights, and
fundamentally different values in their treatment of land. What principles will
govern the terms of their interaction? John Marshall’s 1823 opinion gives the
answer not only to settle the specific dispute in the case, but also to create a
framework that still stands almost two centuries latter.
The challenge in teaching Johnson v. M’Intosh lies not in getting students
to appreciate its significance. It has the hallmarks of the traditional property
case: relativity of title, the idea of exclusivity, the importance of a chain of
title. Like many cases, and all John Marshall opinions, it richly rewards
further study. Articulation of the holding, the ratio decidendi, or the authority
accepted as influential in the case, provides a rigorous introduction to the case
method—and the study of law. The problem in teaching the case, however,
comes from the very characterization of the issue: if this is the story of a rich
and powerful civilization imposing a property regime on unconsenting natives
about to be deprived of their land, how can teaching it become more than an
exercise in political correctness? The first time I read the case as a possible
replacement for Pierson v. Post,2 I wondered if the primary purpose of its
inclusion in the property course was to induce European-American guilt.

1. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
2. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
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Two experiences outside the course deepened my appreciation for the case
and provided greater insight into how to teach it. The first occurred when I
attended a Law and Society Conference in Chicago roughly a decade ago. My
colleague Margalynne Armstrong and I were on a panel with an Israeli and a
Jordanian. The Israeli addressed the problems that arose from communally
held town squares in the West Bank. The Jordanian described how urban
sprawl outside Amman had triggered conflicts between tribes that had
historically held, but for tax reasons never registered, the grazing lands, and
settlers with deeds from the state. In Israel, the issue had symbolically become
a clash in Israeli-Palestinian values; in Jordan, the conflict was more associated
with modernization. But the legal tensions in both countries were a legacy of
British colonial rule, and the conflicts between traditional forms of landholding and the needs of a modern society.3 It was a reminder that Marshall’s
opinion, written in 1823, addresses issues that remain timely two centuries
later.
The resonance with modern predicaments, however, complicates rather
than simplifies the sensitivities involved in teaching the case. I find it
impossible to avoid, for example, Marshall’s images of Native Americans as
“fierce savages . . . with whom it was impossible to mix,”4 and equally
essential to acknowledge Marshall’s efforts to distance himself from some of
the more extreme views of the day by mocking the “pompous claims” of the
Europeans,5 and their belief that “the character and religion of [the] inhabitants
afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior
genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy.”6 Tying the substance of the
decision to the colonial legacy of Great Britain and its celebration of certain
forms of property that will culminate, by the end of the semester, in future
interests runs the risk of discrediting the entire enterprise. I was equally
reluctant, however, to take on the modern version of “the white man’s burden”
and attempt to justify the decision—until I discovered that Joe Singer could do
it for me.7

3. The history of the region is more complex than my brief recollection indicates. For an
account of the evolution of land rights in the area, see George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and
Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467 (1994) (noting that
these disputes reflect Ottoman as well as British rule).
4. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 9 (4th ed. 1998).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Metaphorically, at least. I leave to Singer, who has written ably and well on the subject,
any final judgment as to his own views on the subject, as opposed to his example of how to
present the materials in a way that makes them easier to teach. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 717-18 (2001) [hereinafter SINGER, INTRODUCTION], JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 23-42 (2d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter SINGER].
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Several of my Santa Clara colleagues and I adopted Singer’s text, Property
Law: Rules, Policies and Practices, when it was first published. Singer did
two things that have influenced my teaching of Johnson ever since. He
provided enough of the history of the case to be able to conclude that it was
one of the most pro-Indian decisions to come from the Supreme Court in the
nineteenth century,8 and he drove the point home by pairing Johnson with the
Supreme Court’s 1955 decision in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.9
Johnson is a seminal case both in establishing that Native Americans had
no ability to convey a title to private individuals that would be recognized in
the courts of the United States and in recognizing a Native American right of
occupancy. Tee-Hit-Ton involves the more limited issue of whether the U.S.
government must pay compensation for interference with Native American
possession, and it is arguably wrong.10 The contrast between the two cases
could not be greater. Marshall’s opinion in Johnson can be taught as a subtly
crafted intellectual puzzle; Reed’s as a prosaic recital that masks (or misses)
the complexity underlying the decision. To illustrate the comparison, I try to
get the students to identify the foundation on which Johnson stands. We start
with discovery. Marshall clearly invokes the principle of discovery at the
beginning of the opinion, but he pokes fun at the pretension of discovering an
inhabited continent,11 and concludes that the principle “gave title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.”12
The principle regulates only the relationship of European governments with
each other, it does not address Native American power to convey title.
The next foundation upon which Johnson might arguably stand is the idea
of conquest. Conquest, like discovery, is important to the opinion, and perhaps
one of Marshall’s most noted lines is his assertion that “[c]onquest gives a title
which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny . . . respecting the original
justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.”13 Marshall qualifies
that judgment, however, by adding that where incorporation of a conquered
people into the conqueror’s society is “practicable, humanity demands, and a
wise policy requires, that the rights of the conquered to property should remain
unimpaired.”14 When the English conquered the French in Canada, they did

8. SINGER, supra note 7, at 23-24.
9. 348 U. S. 272 (1955).
10. See, e.g., Milner Ball, Constitution, Courts, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
1, 115 (1987); Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered,
31 HASTINGS L. J. 1215, 1243-44 (1980); SINGER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 717-18.
11. “However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited into
conquest may appear . . . .” SINGER, supra note 7, at 34.
12. Id. at 31.
13. Id. at 33.
14. Id.
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not necessarily conclude that French landowners who chose to remain could
not convey good title to English citizens taking residence in Montreal. The
fact that a conqueror has the power to deprive the conquered of their power of
alienation does not resolve the issue of whether it should, or must do so, as an
element of the law of the land.
This leads to the heart of the opinion. Marshall’s justification accordingly
rests not on universal principles of discovery or conquest, but on the particulars
of European-American/Native American relationships.
Even then, he
distances himself from too stereotypical a characterization of the relationship,
observing: “We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists,
merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel
hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their limits.”15 Instead,
he focuses on the particular history of the United States, observing:
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.
To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a
wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they
were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel
by arms every attempt on their independence.16

The character of the Indians and the nature of the wars that followed (“in
which the whites were not always the aggressors”) led to the principle that:
[T]he Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be
protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their land, but to be
deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others. However this
restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized
nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has
been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may,
perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by the Courts
of justice . . . .17

Marshall’s opinion is maddening; the precise justifications for his
conclusions elusive. What about the fierce character of the Indians, if not their
status as hunters, prevents them from conveying individual title? Why is the
conclusion with respect to alienation “indispensable to that system under
which the country has been settled,”18 particularly as it applies to tribes at
peace with a settled history of possession of the area in question? Does the

15. Id. This often leads to class discussion that asks whether the idea of individual title
comes with the switch from hunter-gatherers to agriculturalists and ties in nicely with references
to Locke’s labor theory of value, or Demsetz and the role of property rights in dealing with
externalities. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 40-59.
16. SINGER, supra note 7, at 33.
17. Id. at 34.
18. Id.
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opinion rest on custom and power alone, even if “opposed to natural right, and
to the usages of civilized nations?”19 In short, Marshall’s opinion is the perfect
vehicle for introducing students to the intricacies of legal reasoning and the
charms of the Socratic method.
Tee-Hit-Ton has few such virtues. Although the case raises an issue of
first impression, whether federal interference with native possession, in this
case in the form of a sale of timber rights, gives rise to a constitutionally
compensable claim, Justice Reed’s opinion for the Court treats it as a settled
matter.20 Perhaps the most striking line of Reed’s opinion is his declaration
that “[e]very American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when
the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, foods and
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their
land . . . .”21 Marshall’s opinion in 1823 combined a realpolitik analysis with a
careful effort to secure a modicum of recognition for Indian land claims.
Reed’s opinion blithely concludes that no such rights exist for the Tee-HitTon, a tribe whose members are citizens of the United States, and which has
never had other than peaceful ties with the Russians and Americans who
settled in Alaska.22
The most immediate issue in teaching Tee-Hit-Ton is discussing whether it
can be reconciled with Johnson, the major precedent on which Reed relies for
his conclusion. Singer and other Indian law experts maintain that it cannot,23
but my students tend to be sympathetic to Reed. Given the wholesale U.S.
usurpation of Indian land, why should timber sales in 1955 trigger a different
result? After an initial discussion of the question,24 Singer emphasizes that,
contrary to popular opinion, the United States did compensate Indian nations
when it took land pursuant to treaties, and by the fifties, an Indian Claims
Commission had been created to provide compensation at fair market value.25
19. Id.
20. Id. at 41 (“The line of cases adjudicating Indian rights on American soil leads to the
conclusion that Indian occupancy, not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized
by Congress, may be extinguished by the Government without compensation.”).
21. SINGER, supra note 7, at 41.
22. See Newton, supra note 10, at 1243-44 (“To say that the Alaska natives were subjugated
by conquest stretches the imagination too far. The only sovereign act that can be said to have
conquered the Alaska native was the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion itself.”)
23. For a summary of the argument, see SINGER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 717-18.
See also Newton, supra note 10; Ball, supra note 10.
24. I often press the point by exploring the idea of conquest. If President Eisenhower, in
1955, sent federal troops to Alaska to seize Tee-Hit-Ton lands, would the tribe have had no
recourse? Is conquest an unlimited and unreviewable concept even when asserted against
American citizens? Has a tribe that voluntarily became part of the United States been
“conquered”? See Ball, supra note 10, at 115.
25. See SINGER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 716-17.
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I tend to emphasize a different point: if this really turns on an assertion of
power, could either case have come out differently? Although my classes have
engaged in many creative discussions of the issue over the years,26 I have a
hard time imagining a different result in Johnson. The custom was well
established at the time the case was decided.27 Moreover, it is not at all clear
that permitting tribal sale of Indian lands would have benefited Native
Widespread fraud and unscrupulous practices often
Americans.28
characterized European-American land transactions; the specter of
questionable deeds and alcohol-induced bargains haunted potential Native
American land sales.29 Effective policing of the bargains was unlikely, and a
legislative reversal of any judicial decision authorizing the practice almost
certain.30
The outcome in Tee-Hit-Ton is another matter. Not only is it possible to
imagine the Supreme Court deciding that the Alaskan natives should be
compensated for the loss of timber rights; the Alaskan natives were in fact
compensated. Singer reports that Congress, though not constitutionally
obligated to do so, later passed a statute providing $962.5 million plus about
forty million acres of federal public lands to Alaskan natives.31 The Court’s
realpolitick analysis of American history overlooked both the fact that the
26. One year I asked the class to propose a property regime for establishing colonies on a
sparsely inhabited planet in a pre-agricultural stage.
27. See Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. McIntosh, 19
LAW & HIST. REV. 67, 70-79 (2001) (arguing that the opinion rests primarily on well-established
custom).
28. Eric Kades has recently investigated the history of Johnson v. M’Intosh, and concluded
that one of the prime effects of the decision is to give the federal government a monopoly over
the ability to purchase land from the Indians, driving down the price. Eric Kades, The Dark Side
of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1065 (2000). This argument assumes, however, that the tribes would have had some ability to
secure fair bargains. See infra notes 29-30.
29. Kades suggests that defendant M’Intosh may have acquired his deeds from Europeans
settlers through either massive fraud or unscrupulous practices. Kades, supra note 27, at 97-98
(concluding, however, that the most likely explanation is that M’Intosh obtained the lands in
return for legal services that helped establish title). He contrasts the efforts of the Johnson
plaintiffs to make sure they had a valid deed for their test case litigation: Johnson prevented the
Indians from getting “a drop of spirituous liquor during the whole of the negotiation;” he
negotiated slowly for more than a month in order make sure all of the tribes with possible claims
agreed to the terms, and he agreed to a price substantially more than the $24 in trinkets
supposedly paid for Manhattan Island. Id. at 81-82. Even, then, Kades reports that the land that
M’Intosh owned may not have overlapped with the land Johnson claimed, and other tribes may
have originally held some of the land in dispute, though not the land subject to Johnson’s deed.
30. Indeed, Kades notes that many legislatures already had laws on the books forbidding
Native American sales to individual settlers, and that one of the major effects of the decision,
because it was based on common law rather than statutory authority, was to keep the ban in
places in states or in times in which such legislation had lapsed. Id. at 102-04.
31. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act , 43 U.S.C. § 1601; SINGER, supra note 7, at 42.
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Court’s prior decisions left this particular issue open,32 and that in the second
half of the twentieth century the political realities of the nineteenth century did
not necessarily dictate the result of this case.33
In class, I use the comparison between Johnson and Tee-Hit-Ton to explore
the possibilities of the judicial role, and the nature of property rights. The
outcome in Johnson may have been inevitable, but Marshall was a master in
rewriting conventional scripts. Whatever the holding, he saw that he had
considerable leeway in crafting the rationale, and he did so in a way that
carved out some recognition of Indian rights and while distancing himself—
and the United States—from the more pretentious assertions of the colonial
area.34 Reed’s opinion, in contrast, is most notable for its lack of imagination
and empathy. He simply does not conceive of the possibility, in 1955, of
granting Native Americans a greater measure of rights than those in his
“schoolboy” account of American history and, unlike Marshall, he does not
recognize Alaskan natives as actors on the American stage whose interests
deserve legal protection.35 It is easier to appreciate Marshall after dissecting
Reed. It is also ironic that an opinion from an era so overtly hostile to Native
American rights, because of its ambiguity and finesse, may offer more for
twenty-first century law than an opinion only a few decades old.36
The most compelling issue in these cases, at least for Property professors,
however, must be the source of the property regime at the core of these cases.
If the precise basis of Marshall’s holding is elusive, and if Reed’s opinion is
arguably wrong, then the justification for the property rights at issue must
remain forever contested. Are the property regimes of hunter-gatherers and
32. The Tee-Hit-Ton opinion observed that no case had ever held that compensation had to
be paid, but, as Singer observes, neither did any case before Tee-Hit-Ton decide that no
compensation was due. See SINGER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 715-17.
33. Again, it is striking that the Court, in its determination to view the issue as settled, did
not acknowledge that Congress had provided for substantial compensation of Native American
claims. Id. at 717.
34. The Marshall opinion clearly suggests that the Indian right of occupancy was entitled to
legal recognition, observing that “[t]hey were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil,
with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion.” Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). Marshall also stated: “It
has never been contended, that the Indian title amounted to nothing.” Id.
35. Reed states: “Our conclusion does not uphold harshness as against tenderness toward the
Indians, but it leaves with Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the
termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land rather than making compensation
for its value a rigid constitutional principle . . . .” SINGER, supra note 7, at 41. The paternalism
in the statement, however, may be more demeaning than Marshall’s reference to “fierce savages,”
and less justifiable. A rationale that explained why the matter was not justifiable in terms of
jurisprudential principles would have been more appropriate.
36. In this sense, I also like to remind my students of the Maine litigation in which tribes laid
claim to two-thirds of the state based on the Johnson principle that only the federal government
and not the state could validly acquire title. See SINGER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 7, at 727.
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agriculturists inevitably incompatible?37 Is the real problem the chaos that
would be introduced by the need to determine the validity of Indian deeds? Or
is the result simply an assertion of power that advances the interests of the
conqueror over the conquered? Whatever the answer, Anglo-American real
property law follows from adoption of a regime of private, individual,38
exclusive and alienable title39—and the larger issue of property’s role will
continue to occupy the rest of the course.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS REVISITED: FROM WILD ANIMALS TO WHEEL OF
FORTUNE
My initiation into the world of Property professors came with the study of
wild animals. I had just been hired at Santa Clara and was about to begin
teaching Property despite a background limited to a stint in a landlord-tenant
clinic in law school and the experience of buying, selling and renting my own
residences. I was invited to help out with orientation, and it turned out that
orientation focused on an introduction to the case method that featured Pierson
v. Post,40 and the line of cases assigning rights in wild animals. The cases
included the traditional panoply of Pierson, Glen v. Rich,41 and Keeble v.
Hickeringill,42 and added to them the note cases in many textbooks involving

37. While the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion ultimately rests on its interpretation of American history
and precedent, it does engage in an extended analysis of the nature of Alaskan native property
use, concluding that the Tee-Hit-Tons were in “a hunting and fishing stage of civilization” that
was “like the use of the nomadic tribes of the States Indians.” Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States, 348
U.S. 272, 287-88 (1955). See SINGER, supra note 7, at 41; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4,
at 40-59. Compare Johnson with Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347-57 (1967).
38. The concept of individual versus collective ownership has been the subject of extensive
commentary. Nonetheless, even an individual system makes some provision for collective title,
such as joint tenancies, condominiums, et cetera. For an overview of the issue, see DUKEMINIER
& KRIER, supra note 4, at 52-59. See also Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of
Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129 (1998).
39. SINGER follows up on the discussion of Johnson and Tee-Hit-Ton by including Nome
2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990), in his materials on adverse possession. The
case involves an adverse possession claim by an Alaskan native family against a company with a
traditional deed. Nome 2000 opposed the adverse possession claim, in part, on the ground that
the possession was not exclusive since the family, in accordance with native Alaskan custom,
allowed others to fish and hunt on the land. The court nonetheless upheld the claim, ruling that it
was consistent with possession by a true owner in that region, and that permissive use did not
defeat the claim of title. SINGER, supra note 7, at 136-41.
40. 3 Cal. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
41. 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (holding that a whale that washes up on the beach with an
identifiable lance belongs to the owner of the lance).
42. 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707) (stating that interference with a wildfowl attracted to a
decoy pond is actionable).
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silver foxes and oil and gas.43 Fresh from George Mason and an exploration of
law and economics, I tried to reconcile the conflicting decisions. The answer I
came up with was a conventional one: the outcomes in the cases reflect a
balance between the extent of the investment and the importance of property
rights in encouraging it44 weighed against the transaction costs involved in
policing the rights accorded.45 Determining which wild fox running through
the woods is subject to hot pursuit is not worth the effort; returning a valuable
pelt from a readily identified fox raised for profit is. Decisions about foxes and
whales lend themselves to simply stated principles more easily than the more
muddied terrain of Native American rights.46
Once introduced, the principle of balance between investment incentives
and enforcement costs can be applied to the assignment of property rights in
any arena, and my colleague, Dorothy Glancy, has developed an introduction
to intellectual property47 that collects three sets of common law cases to test
the importance of property rights in the emerging law that governs the
regulation of ideas and technology. Johnson and the wild animals cases, if not
carefully dissected, often leave the impression that property rights expand to
protect any new industry if enough money is at stake.48 Glancy’s collection
43. See Reese v. Hughes, 109 So. 731 (1926); see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4,
at 35-6. The fox case involved valuable foxes with distinctive pelts brought from outside the area
and bred on a Mississippi farm. A fox escaped, was shot, and the farmer sought to recover the
pelt. A number of cases address ownership of oil and gas reserves that migrate to neighboring
land when the neighbor begins drilling. Compare Hammonds v. Central Ky. Natural Gas, 75
S.W.2d 204 (1934), with Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Zuckerman, 234 Cal. Rptr. 630 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987). See generally Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 73 (1985).
44. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 38, at 130-31. Rose explains that:
We humans are lazy, and disinclined to work. But property, by concentrating resource
control on individuals, takes advantage of each individual’s sinfulness—or as we now call
it, self-interest. With property, each individual harvests the rewards of her care and effort
in the management of her resources, just as she suffers the losses from her sloth and poor
management; those features of property make her vastly more likely to exercise diligence
and prudence about the things she owns.
Id.
45. For a fuller examination of these ideas, see Rose, supra note 38, and DAVID D.
FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS
(2000).
46. Johnson, however, can certainly be taught in terms of the need for certainty in real
property titles, and the difficulties of policing Native American deeds. See discussion supra note
29.
47. DOROTHY J. GLANCY, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR
SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW FIRST-YEAR PROPERTY STUDENTS (2001).
48. The traditional cases, for example, often pair the refusal to recognize an interest in wild
animals in Pierson with the greater protection accorded the commercially profitable decoy pond
in Keeble or whaling industry customs in Glen. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at
19-40.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

640

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:629

presents a more complex picture that contrasts common law rights with
statutory protection, and both expands and contracts the assertion of rights
within developing industries.49
A.

Quasi-Property, Unfair Competition, and Investment in Information

The first set of cases pairs International News Service v. Associated
Press50 (INS v. AP) with Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.51 I have added Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk52 from the Dukeminier &
Krier text and jettisoned wild animals and finders, colorful though the
discussions have been.53 INS v. AP, which involved International News’s
appropriation and resale of breaking stories from the AP wire,54 tracks the
lessons from the more recent of the wild animal cases. The Court characterizes
the case as one where the defendant
is taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is
salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and
selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by
disposing of it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant’s members is
appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown.55

In short, when someone has invested time, money and effort in producing
something valuable for the public and a competitor appropriates the product for
his own benefit, the competitor has interfered with a quasi-property interest,
and can be sued for unfair competition.
What then to make of Feist Publications? Rural Telephone Service
Company, like most phone companies, collects names, addresses and phone
numbers and publishes them in a yearly telephone directory. The directory
earns its revenues by charging for ads in the yellow pages. Feist Publications
publishes area-wide telephone directories that cover larger areas than
individual phone companies, and competes with them for yellow pages
advertising. When Rural became the only telephone company to refuse
permission to use the data it had collected, Feist included Rural’s data in its
directory anyway, and Rural sued. Feist won, despite the fact that Rural had
49. See generally GLANCY, supra note 47.
50. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
51. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
52. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
53. Some of my colleagues include both, but reduce the time spent on wild animals to a
single class.
54. INS acquired AP’s stories from a number of sources including bulletin boards and early
editions, particularly those published on the East Coast. INS, 248 U.S. at 230. See GLANCY,
supra note 47, at 2. AP also alleged that INS used bribery to obtain the information, but that
allegation was not critical to the outcome of the case. INS, 248 U.S. at 231.
55. INS, 248 U.S. at 239-40. See GLANCY, supra note 47, at 5.
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invested time, money and effort in producing something valuable for the
public, and Feist was a competitor who appropriated the product for its own
benefit.
How can INS and Feist Publications be reconciled? The easy way is to
note that INS turned on an unfair competition claim while Rural’s lawyers
raised only the issue of copyright. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that
copyright did not extend either to the news or to phone numbers, no copyright
violation existed in either case. “Is this an issue of malpractice?” I ask my
class. Would Feist have turned out differently if the issue of unfair
competition had been raised? When the questions are presented in proper
Socratic fashion, first leading the students toward the comparison of the causes
of action, and then asking whether the different counts explain the result, the
students are often thrown off stride by the questions. But they quickly begin to
resist the conclusion. The first paragraph of the opinion lays the foundation for
an alternative answer. It observes that Rural “is a certified public utility” that
publishes a “typical” telephone directory “as a condition of its monopoly
franchise.”56 Rather than reflecting entrepreneurial enterprise, Rural collected
its data as an incidental part of the phone service it provided. The Court notes,
in a passage that first-year students often overlook, that the District Court (in a
decision later than the one under review) ruled that Rural’s refusal to grant
permission to use the data “was motivated by an unlawful purpose ‘to extend
its monopoly in telephone service to a monopoly in yellow pages
advertising.’”57 How can a company press a claim for unfair competition when
it is guilty of monopolistic practices?
The reconciliation of the two cases occurs a little too quickly, so I press on
to include Cheney Brothers. Here, no monopolistic practices exist. A silk
scarf manufacturer who had invested time, money and effort in producing
distinctive designs finds that a competitor has appropriated the designs as its
own. Surely this is unfair competition? Alas, Learned Hand rules for the
defendant. The plaintiffs cite INS v. AP in support of their claim, and the
Second Circuit observes:
we agree that, if it meant to lay down a general doctrine, it would cover this
case; at least, the language of the majority opinion goes so far. We do not
believe that it did. While it is of course true that law ordinarily speaks in
general terms, there are cases where the occasion is at once the justification
for, and the limit of, what is decided. This appears to us [to be] such an
instance; we think that no more was covered than situations substantially
similar to those then at bar. The difficulties of understanding it otherwise are
insuperable. We are to suppose that the court meant to create a sort of

56. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 342. See GLANCY, supra note 47, at 13.
57. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 343 (citing Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 737 F.
Supp. 610, 622 (D. Kan. 1990)).
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common-law patent or copyright for reasons of justice. Either would
flagrantly conflict with the scheme which Congress has for more than a
century devised to cover the subject-matter.58

INS had been limited to its facts more than a half-century before Feist
Publications reached the Supreme Court.59 The expansion of property rights
has its limits, even when justice and commerce seem to demand otherwise.
The Glancy materials use the discussion in these cases to introduce patent,
copyright, trademark and trade secrets more systematically than most property
texts, providing a short description of the origins and current status of each.
The cases set up a comparison of patent and copyright and the common law
forms of property protection. INS, Feist Publications and Cheney Brothers all
raise—and reject—the possible application of copyright law to news, phone
numbers and scarf designs. None of the products is original,60 and the
statutory forms of recognition last not just for the brief shelf life of the
profitable use of the information, but for a lengthy prescribed period that
cannot be changed. Common law and statutory forms of property differ, and
property rights are not always so easy to come by—or so the students who read
Feist Publications and Cheney Brothers may think. Bette Midler and Vanna
White, more colorful characters than any of those involved in a fox hunt,
recently suggested otherwise to appellate courts and won. In the process they
add a new wrinkle to the discussion, the idea that the expansion of property
rights may involve not only the possibility of “theft” from the powerless,61 but
the inhibition of public as well as private discourse.62
B.

Personality, Publicity, Privacy and Property

Midler v. Ford Motor Co.63 and White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc. should be included in every property text. The facts are compelling,
Kozinki’s dissent could fill a class discussion by itself, and the cases present
64

58. Cheney Bros., 35 F.2d at 280. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 63-64.
59. On this point, see also the excerpt in DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, from Douglas
G. Baird, Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 413-414 (1983); infra text accompanying notes 65-66.
60. The court in Cheney Bros. specifically observes that the silk scarf designs do not satisfy
the originality requirement needed for a patent. 35 F.2d at 279. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra
note 4, at 63.
61. One of my Criminal Law colleagues likes to write “Property is Theft” on the board so it
will be there when I enter the classroom. I only occasionally notice, but I am indebted to one of
my students, Wanda Ochoa, for insisting that I respond by reading PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON,
WHAT IS PROPERTY? AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND GOVERNMENT, Chapter 1,
1 (1890).
62. For a fuller discussion, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
63. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
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one of the most far-reaching expansions of modern common law property
rights.65
Bette Midler’s case is the more sympathetic of the two. The advertising
agency for Ford Motor Company asked Midler to appear in a commercial.
Midler, who did not do commercials, refused. So the agency, which “had paid
a very substantial sum to the copyright proprietor” for one of Midler’s songs,
hired a singer who “sounded like Midler,” and ran the ad.66 Midler sued. The
court rejected her claim of unfair competition because Midler who, after all,
did not do commercials, was not in the business of advertising and the ad did
not curtail the market she was in. Instead, the court characterized the sound of
her voice as an attribute of her identity and concluded, therefore, that to
“impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity.”67 The court held that “when a
distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately
imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not
theirs and have committed a tort in California.”68
Vanna White’s case builds on Midler’s. Samsung’s ad agency ran a
humorous series of commercials that poked fun at the twenty-first century.
One ad, for example, depicted a raw steak with the caption: “Revealed to be
health food. 2010 A.D.” The ad that gave rise to the lawsuit showed a robot
dressed in a wig, gown and pearls that intended to evoke Vanna White, posed
next to a Wheel of Fortune game show set. The caption read: “Longest
running game show. 2012 A.D.”
The case involves two issues. First, did the ad infringe on White’s
common law right of publicity? The ad showed neither White’s name nor
likeness. Indeed, no one could mistake the robot for a real person, much less
the real Vanna White. Instead, the opinion emphasized that “television and
other media create marketable celebrity identity value,” and recognition of that
value does not depend on whether the celebrity achieved her fame through
“rare ability” or “dumb luck.”69 Invoking White’s identity, with or without her
name or likeness, appropriates her right of publicity. Second, even if it is
otherwise inappropriate to invoke celebrity identity in an ad, is there a first
amendment parody defense that protects defendant’s right to lampoon public
figures? The Ninth Circuit held that the difference between a “parody” and a
“knockoff” is “the difference between fun and profit” and the parody defense
was better left to the non-commercial realm.70 Property rights, in the form of a
65. Although California Civil Code section 3344 prohibits use of a person’s “name, voice,
signature, photograph or likeness” without his or her consent, the Midler opinion did not rest on
the statute. GLANCY, supra note 47, at 29.
66. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
67. Id. at 463. See GLANCY, supra note 47 at 29.
68. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. See GLANCY, supra note 47 at 29
69. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
70. Id. at 1401.
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common law right of publicity, give Bette Midler and Vanna White the right to
control commercial use of their images.
Kozinski’s dissent emphasizes how potentially sweeping this new right
may be, and he starts his opinion with Saddam Hussein’s complaints about ads
using his image,71 and George Lucas’s efforts to prevent advocates of the
Strategic Defense Initiative from naming it “Star Wars.”72 To determine just
how far this new right extends, I like to ask my students what the two cases are
really about: commercial exploitation or the right to control as personal a
subject as one’s image? The Midler holding could be restated as a series of
elements, requiring 1) use of the distinctive voice of a professional singer; 2)
that is widely known and; 3) deliberately imitated; 4) in order to sell a product.
White can be similarly restated to require 1) use of the distinctive image of a
celebrity; 2) that is widely known and; 3) deliberated imitated or evoked; 4) to
sell a product. Given these formulations, do Midler and White apply to
Saddam Hussein?
These questions can easily occupy a substantial part of a class. Hussein
clearly has 1) a distinctive image; 2) that is widely known, and; 3) the
commercial in question ran a picture of him; 4) to sell a product. He seems to
meet the technical elements of the cause of action. Hussein’s celebrity, unlike
Midler’s or White’s, however, was not cultivated through commercial use.
Does this matter if the offending ad agency is using his image for their own
commercial benefit?I query whether it depends on the nature of the harm.
Midler and White (like Saddam Hussein) are not in the advertising business
and it is not lost income that concerns them. Rather, it is the loss of control
over a carefully cultivated image that may be tarnished by commercial
associations not of their choosing. Midler simply doesn’t do commercials, and
White’s commercial marketability can hardly be helped by the suggestion that
she can be replaced by a robot. Saddam Hussein’s notoriety, in contrast, has
not been burnished to advance his commercial marketability, and the U.S. ad,
however much it accuses him of tyranny, is unlikely to affect the profitability
of his personal image (or even the consequences were he to find himself a
defendant in a proceeding before the Hague). Conversely, if the wrongful
appropriation of one’s image is more akin to theft, and the harm is the loss of
control over an aspect of one’s personality, then the marketability of the image
should only go to the measure of damages and not to the nature of the cause of
action. The First Amendment may protect editorial page cartoonists’ right to

71. White, 989 F.2d at 1515. Kozinski cites Eben Shapiro, Rising Caution on Use of
Celebrity Images, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at D20 (noting Iraqi diplomat’s objection on right of
publicity grounds to ad containing Hussein’s picture and caption “History has shown what
happens when one source controls all the information”).
72. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985).
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lampoon Middle East dictators, but a right of publicity, if rooted in personal
identity, may not necessarily vary with commercial appeal.
Kozinksi’s dissent, which is willing to accept the commercial nature of the
right to publicity, questions the wisdom of the result even if restricted to the
commercial realm. He lectures that intellectual property law “is full of careful
balances between what’s set aside for the owner and what’s left in the public
domain for the rest of us,”73 and he queries:
Intellectual property rights aren’t free: They’re imposed at the expense of
future creators and of the public at large. Where would we be if Charles
Lindbergh had an exclusive right in the concept of a heroic solo aviator? If
Arthur Conan Doyle had gotten a copyright in the idea of the detective story,
or Albert Einstein had patented the theory of relativity?74

Kozinski reminds us that if one side of intellectual property is protection of the
investment in ideas then, the other side is dissemination of the product. Patents
guarantee a monopoly on use for a relatively short period while giving
inventors an incentive to make public their discoveries. Copyright exchanges a
longer period of protection for exceptions such as fair use. Kozinski concludes
that:
Intellectual property law assures authors the right to their original expression,
but encourages others to build freely on the ideas that underlie it . . . . We give
authors certain exclusive rights, but in exchange we get a richer public domain.
The majority ignores this wise teaching, and all of us are the poorer for it.75

Property professors are, however, richer for Kozinski’s dissent. By placing
the right to publicity squarely in the commercial sphere in which it is rooted,
he is able to recall the historic tradeoffs that have always underlain intellectual
property law. He counsels that property rights, with their right to exclude, can
impede commerce as well as advance it, and impoverish the public domain
even if they protect individual interests. Above all, he reminds us that property
rights “aren’t free,” and that balance rather than certainty is the foundation for
their administration.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE COMING CENTURY: FROM THE FOUNDATION OF
CONTRACT TO AN ELEMENT OF STATUS?
Kozinski’s position lost in White, but concern for the colonial ambitions of
property law carries greater weight when the subject changes from intellectual
property to bodily products. If the explosion in information technology
dominated the latter half of the twentieth century, some predict that it will be

73. White, 989 F.2d at 1516.
74. Id. See GLANCY, supra note 47, at 37.
75. White, 989 F.2d at 1517. GLANCY, supra note 47, at 38
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biotechnology that explodes on the scene in the twenty-first.76
Our
understanding of the human body—of genetics, stem cells, reproduction, the
human genone, bioengineering—has been increasing so exponentially that we
are now at the point of assigning property rights in things that did not exist, or
which we had no way to know existed, only a short time ago. At the same
time, we are more cautious about biology than information technology.
Buying or selling hearts and kidneys and excluding others from cancer curing
chemicals seem to be more radical developments than keeping a Vanna White
robot out of a television commercial. The extension of the property realm into
the allocation of biological products has been even more haphazard than the
development of intellectual property generally, and Glancy’s materials provide
two pairs of cases that test these developments.
A.

Informed Consent and Posthumous Conception

Most textbooks now include Moore v. Regents of the University of
California;77 Hecht v. Superior Court78 provides an excellent companion case.
In both cases, property rubric is used to allocate decision-making power, in the
first case over the use of spleen cells for medical research and in the second to
decide whether sperm cells will be available for posthumous conception. But
in both cases property terms prove too blunt-edged a sword. When the courts
lose sight of the idea that ownership can involve a bundle of sticks rather than
a fixed collection of rights, they muddy rather than enlighten the underlying
policy debates.
Moore is thus one of those cases useful for testing what property means,
and much of the fun in teaching it consists of getting the class to figure out
exactly what the court did—and did not—decide. It is therefore frustrating to
find that many edited versions of the case leave out the answers to the
questions I ask in class. Moore involved a leukemia patient whose cancerous
spleen was removed from his body, and who was asked by his doctors to
continue to come for seven years of follow-up care in which the doctors
continued to remove tissues, blood and other bodily fluids.79 What the doctors
did not tell Moore was that they were using his spleen and other tissues for
research, and had patented a cell line, made from his cells, which Moore
alleged might become part of an industry valued at $3 billion.80 Moore sued,
among other things, for breach of informed consent and conversion.
76. See, e.g., JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY: HARNESSING THE GENE AND
REMAKING THE WORLD (1998).
77. 793 P.2d 479, cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1990).
78. 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, review denied, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 428 (1993).
79. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 66.
80. Moore, 793 P.2d at 476. In fact, the doctors never realized any substantial amounts from
the cell line. Hank Greely at Stanford Law School has gathered a much fuller account of what
took place in Moore that differs substantially from the reported opinion.
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My first question in this (and many other cases) is what was the issue
before the court? The opinion addresses the existence of a cause of action in
conversion, and starts the discussion with the observation that “[t]o establish a
conversion, plaintiff must establish an actual interference with his ownership
or right of possession . . . .”81 The court stakes the idea of conversion on the
existence of ownership, and apparently little more. So my next question is
whether the court ever determined whether Moore had a property interest in his
cells that survived their extraction from his body. Again, the issue seems
critical to the court’s analysis as it observes that “[s]ince Moore clearly did not
expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal, to sue for their
conversion he must have retained an ownership interest in them. But there are
several reasons to doubt that he did retain any such interests,”82 which the
court then sets out at some length. At the end of the discussion, however, there
is no conclusion. Instead, the court moves on to the next issue, whether
conversion liability should be extended to the facts of Moore. Here, however,
the court subtly shifts ground. In a line edited out of some casebooks, the court
observes that “[w]hile we do not purport to hold that excised cells can never be
property for any purpose whatsoever, the novelty of Moore’s claim demands
express consideration of the policies to be served by extending liability.”83 By
the end of the opinion, the court has ruled that no property interest exists
sufficient to support a cause of action in conversion.84 But it does not explain
whether this is true because no ownership right exists at all, because that right
has been so limited as to be effectively worthless,85 or for policy reasons that
preclude recognition of an action in conversion even if an ownership claim can
be made. In short, it is not clear whether this is a case about property—in the
strict sense—at all.
The court is somewhat clearer about the policy concerns that dictated the
decision. It balances two considerations: the patient’s right to make
autonomous medical decisions and the researcher’s ability to pursue socially

81. Id. at 485.
82. Id
83. Id. at 490.
84. Id. at 194.
85. The court observed: “By restricting how excised cells may be used and requiring their
eventual destruction, the statute eliminates so many of the rights originally attached to property
that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to “property” or “ownership” for
purposes of conversion law.” Moore, 793 P.2d at 489. The problem with this analysis is that it is
not linked to a definition of “ownership” for purposes of conversion law. Consider any manner
of restricted items: radioactive waste, handguns, kidney stones. Would we say with respect to
any of them that if they were stolen (or wrongfully taken) from a hospital or home that no
conversion had occurred? We might conclude with respect to some of the items (a kidney stone,
for example) that they have no market value and therefore no damages are appropriate, but I
doubt that we would conclude that they could not be “owned.”
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useful activities.86 The problem with conversion is that it is a strict liability
offense; if a patient owns spleen cells excised from his body, and if he has not
otherwise abandoned them, then he may be entitled to their return or to
compensation for their market value, even if the researcher had no idea that the
cells belonged to someone else.87 The court attempted to solve the problem by
separating the sticks in the bundle, by distinguishing the power to determine
disposition from the ability to sell and by tying the separation to the different
causes of action alleged in the complaint. It accordingly upheld the action for
breach of fiduciary duty because of the failure to secure informed consent
while dismissing the action for conversion.
This solution, however, does not fully hold. Breach of fiduciary duty
depends on the doctor’s failure to inform the patient of circumstances that may
affect the patient’s decisions about his medical care, rather than the patient’s
wishes to share in the profits from the doctor’s research.88 If a patient knows
that the doctor stands to benefit from a given course of care, for example, he
may want a second opinion. The problem in a case like this, however, is that a
second opinion is unlikely to change the course of treatment. Moore’s
leukemia was life-threatening; removal of his spleen was hardly elective
surgery. At most, he might have chosen follow-up care closer to home, instead
of continuing to travel to California for check-ups after he had moved farther
away. The doctors’ duty to inform him of their potential conflict of interest
has little to do with the patient’s desire to cut the best deal he could have for
consent to use his spleen.
To test the issue, I use the following example.89 Suppose Moore, having
been duly informed by his doctors of the research potential of his cells,
consents to the splenectomy, but insists that the doctors may not use his cells

86. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492.
87. The hunter who kills the silver fox, after all, may be liable for return of the pelt even if
he had no way of knowing before he shot it that the fox had been commercially bred rather than
naturally born in the woods of Mississippi. See supra note 43.
88. The court explains:
These principles lead to the following conclusions: (1) a physician must disclose personal
interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that may affect
the physician’s professional judgment; and (2) a physician’s failure to disclose such
interests may give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures without
informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 476. The “wrong” in this case is the performance of the medical procedures
without consent, not the use of the cells without consent.
89. Some years, I also used a second hypo: A patient gives birth in a hospital that routinely
harvests placental tissue and sells it to a cosmetics company. The patient, who had learned of the
practice from a nurse, loudly insists that she does not want her placental tissue used for such a
purpose. The responsible (or irresponsible as the case may be) hospital employee sells the tissue
anyway. Have the patient’s rights been violated? If an employee steals the placental tissue from
the hospital, can the hospital sue the employee for conversion?
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without payment. The doctors nonetheless sell his tissues to commercial
researchers. What result?
The Moore court sidestepped the distinction between a property interest
sufficient to assert decision-making power and one that would permit sale of
human cells by appearing to deny the existence of any property interest at all.
Yet, in another passage sometimes edited out of the opinion, the court observes
that:
It may be that some limited right to control the use of excised cells does
survive operation of the statute. There is, for example, no need to read the
statute to permit “scientific use” contrary to the patient’s expressed wish. A
fully informed patient may always withhold consent to treatment by a
physician whose research plans the patient does not approve. That right,
however, as already discussed, is protected by the fiduciary-duty and
informed-consent theories.90

This passage, however, misses the distinction between the remedies to the two
causes of action. If the doctors in my hypothetical sell Moore’s tissue in
violation of the patient’s expressed wishes, what is the measure of damages?
Moore consented to the surgery, and he appeared to have had no special
attachment to his spleen cells.91 His only real loss was the market value of his
tissue. If the court awards such a remedy, it will in effect have created an
action for conversion whatever name it gives to the tort. If it refuses to do so,
it may render the breach of informed consent in the sense of the passage
quoted above meaningless.92
My students believe in property. They almost always argue that the patient
should have been paid for use of his cells. The more economic minded of
them observe that if patients do not have to be compensated, they are less
likely to consent to use of their tissue. Those with medical experience,
however, point out that, in practice, informed consent works almost exactly as
the court envisioned. Few patients have cells that are distinctive enough to be
valuable, and almost all patients consent to use of their cells for research. If
another Moore wished to finagle for a better deal in exchange for his unique
contribution to medical science, he would at least have the opportunity to
present his case to the doctors, and if, in the end, he withheld consent, doctors
are unlikely to knowingly violate the patient’s wishes.93 Consent forms have
90. Moore, 793 P.2d at 488. In fairness to casebook authors, Moore is a long opinion with
numerous concurrences and dissents, and a challenge to edit.
91. Sale of placental tissue, as suggested in note 89, supra, may be different because the
patient may claim religious or psychological objections, giving rise to an alternative way of
measuring the harm.
92. The court could, however, choose to permit the action, and the award of punitive
damages.
93. Moore, of course, leaves open whether such a contract would be enforceable. See
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 80-81.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

650

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:629

become so ubiquitous that the pure common law issue left open in Moore, of
the patient’s ability to control disposition of her cells after their extraction from
her body, does not arise. Moore’s inartful conception of property slows the
overt commercialization of the field while doing little harm in the real world.
Hecht v. Superior Court94 drive the point home. William Kane, who had
lived with Deborah Hecht for five years before his death, deposited fifteen
vials of sperm in a Los Angeles sperm bank and committed suicide a month
later.95 The contract with the sperm bank provided that the sperm should be
released to Hecht for the purpose of bearing his child, and his will confirmed
his desire to have Hecht impregnated with the sperm. Kane’s adult children
from a previous marriage opposed his wishes, in part because they thought
additional children would reduce their claims to Hecht’s estate.96
Kane’s children invoked Moore to argue that “decedent had no ownership
or possessory interest in his sperm once it left his body,” and the sperm could
thus not be part of the estate. The California appellate court, however, had no
trouble concluding that “the decedent had an interest, in the nature of
ownership, to the extent that he had decision making authority as to the sperm
within the scope of the policy set by law,” and the sperm therefore fit within
the broad definition of property contained in the Probate Code.97 In California,
at least, cells extracted from the body can be property for one purpose and not
another. The term “property” as a distinct element of analysis would appear to
lose much of its explanatory power while the sticks in the bundle (meaning,
decision-making authority) determine judicial outcomes.
B.

Contract and Property

Moore refused to recognize a property interest in excised cells, yet
acknowledged the possibility of decision-making power. Hecht used the terms
synonymously, concluding that to the extent that Kane had decision-making
power, he also had an ownership interest that constituted property within the
meaning of the probate code. To this, Glancy adds Kass v. Kass98 and A.Z. v.

94. 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, review denied, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 428 (1993).
95. For a less prosaic account of Kane’s life, see DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 85,
who describe him as a lawyer “equally fluent in Greek mythology, tax shelters and computer
programming.”
96. GLANCY, supra note 47, at 41.
97. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act responded to Hecht by
adopting a provision that: “An individual who dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a
child is conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual’s egg or sperm is
not the parent of the resulting child.” 9B U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 1997). The result is intended to
settle inheritance so that frozen pre-zygotes cannot disrupt distribution of the estate many years
after the decedent’s death. So much for Rule against Perpetuities hypothethicals!
98. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
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B.Z.,99 which together turn the discussion on its head. Is it possible that frozen
pre-zygotes,100 which have expressly been held to be property for purposes of
an action in retinue,101 and are routinely destroyed by contract, cannot be the
subject of a binding agreement for implantation? In other words, if Moore
contemplated decision-making power without property, can there also be
property without decision-making power?
Hecht, in deciding the status of sperm, referred to the cases involving
frozen pre-zygotes and observed that “the value of sperm lies in its potential to
create a child after fertilization, growth, and birth” and that it is thus entitled to
greater respect than other human tissue because of its potential to become a
person. At the same time, which held that frozen pre-zygotes could satisfy the
property requirement of an action in detinue, the York, court quoted the Ethics
Statement of the American Fertility Society to the effect that: “It is understood
that the gametes and concepti are the property of the donors. The donors
therefore have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposition of
these items, provided such disposition is within medical and ethical
guidelines . . . .”102 The California court, in Hecht, acting squarely within the
tradition of the pre-zygote cases that had been decided up until that point, was
eager to leave the decision as to whether to proceed with posthumous
conception squarely in private hands, and found no public policy objections to
Kane’s expressed intention of leaving his sperm to Deborah Hecht.103
Kass v. Kass, decided by the high court in New York five years later,
affirmed the propriety of private disposition of frozen pre-zygotes. The New
York couple in the case were divorcing five years after they created the pre99. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
100. Kass defined “pre-zygotes” as “eggs which have been penetrated by sperm but have not
yet joined genetic material.” 696 N.E.2d 174, 177 n. 1.
101. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). In York v. Jones, a couple who had
enlisted the services of a Virginia fertility clinic moved to California and wanted to take their
frozen pre-zygotes with them. The clinic, which wished to keep their business, refused to
surrender custody. In the ensuing lawsuit, the court held that the couple had a property interest in
the pre-zygotes sufficient to establish an action in detinue.
102. Id. at 426 n.5.
103. His children had tried to assert public policy objections to a donation to an unmarried
woman and to posthumous parenthood, but the court rejected both assertions. GLANCY, supra
note 47, at 45-47. An interesting counterpoint is the English case in which a wife had sperm
removed from her comatose husband and wanted to take it to Belgium where a fertility clinic was
willing to assist in her efforts to bear his child. The English courts initially ruled against her
request because her husband, who died from meningitis at thirty-five without regaining
consciousness, had not given his informed consent. The widow eventually won by appealing to
trade provisions that prevented England from blocking the export of the sperm, though she was
later back in the news in her efforts to have English law changed so that her husband could be
recognized as the child’s father. Jenny Booth, Diane Blood looks to Europe in fight over her
son’s name; Widow insists the battle for law to acknowledge boy’s father is not over, THE
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 29, 2001, at 11.
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zygotes.104 The wife sought to have the fertilized eggs implanted while her
husband objected to the burdens of unwanted fatherhood. The New York
Court of Appeals not only upheld the contract that provided for donation of the
pre-zygotes for research in the event of a dispute, it embraced contract as the
preferred way to address these issues, emphasizing that: “To the extent
possible, it should be the progenitors—not the State and not the courts—who
by their prior directive make this deeply personal life choice felt.”105
A.Z. v. B.Z. is the surprising case of the group. This case, decided by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 2000, overturned for the first time
a contractual resolution of the issue. In this case, unlike all of the others that
had been decided up until this point, the fertility clinic contract provided that if
the couple separated, the embryos would be returned to the wife for implant.
The court refused to enforce the agreement, partly because it doubted whether
the contract accurately reflected the intentions of the parties, and partly on
public policy grounds. The court explained that:
[W]e conclude that, even had the husband and wife entered into an
unambiguous agreement between themselves regarding the disposition of the
frozen preembryos, we would not enforce an agreement that would compel one
donor to become a parent against his or her will. As a matter of public policy,
we conclude that forced procreation is not an area amenable to judicial
enforcement . . . .106

Unlike the California Supreme Court in Moore, the Massachusetts court
did not rewrite the definition of property to reach its result. It left undisturbed
the earlier cases finding pre-zygotes to be property, and the proper subject of
contract.107 Instead, it addressed the public policy question of involuntary
parenthood head-on, and concluded that whatever the prior agreement of the
parties, the court was not willing to order a result that produced a pregnancy
against the contemporaneous wishes of one of the would-be parents. In this
case, public law trumped rather than manipulated private law to advance its
purposes. A.Z. v. B.Z. this provides a personal property counterpoint to State v.

104. Fertility treatments often involve harvesting and fertilizing more eggs than can safely be
implanted at any one time. If the couple then wishes to try for another pregnancy, the stored prezygotes can be used, easing the expense and inconvenience of the second procedure. GLANCY,
supra note 47, at 48.
105. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
106. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Mass. 2000).
107. The court notes expressly, for example, that there “is no impediment to the enforcement
of such contracts [providing for destruction or donation of the preembryos] by the clinics or by
the donors against the clinics, consistent with the principles of this opinion.” GLANCY, supra
note 47, at 59 n.9. Conversely, the court in Kass also noted that the parties in that case had not
alleged either that the contract violated public policy or that changed circumstances compelled a
different result. Id. at 51 n.3.
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Shack,108 the next case in the traditional canon. Shack’s themes, from a
different area of the law, and a different generation, echo the Massachusetts
concerns:
Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and are
limited by it. Title to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny
of persons the owner permits to come upon the premises. Their well-being
must remain the paramount concern of a system of law. Indeed, the needs of
the occupants may be so imperative and their strength so weak, that the law
will deny the occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential to
their health, welfare or dignity.109

Interests in land and frozen pre-zygotes are not so different after all. The stage
has been set for a return to real property and the remainder of the course.110
IV. CONCLUSION: IF PROPERTY IS THEFT, IT MAY MATTER ONLY IF PROPERTY
RIGHTS MAKE THINGS WORTH STEALING
If Property has not quite regained the status it held at the time of
Blackstone, it has acquired something equally important: a new field of critics
eager to write “Property is Theft” on my blackboard and to decry the
“propertization” of new technologies and accompanying law. When I first
started teaching, the old dean who mentored me insisted that the key to
understanding the first year in law school was to recognize that Property was
the foundation for everything else.
Settled understandings (however
superficial) of first possession and adverse possession cases unthinkable in
places with modern California real estate prices did little to persuade me of the
importance of his approach. Intellectual property at the turn of a new century
is another matter. Property has again become a course that can be taught from
the front pages of the newspaper—and on which arguably rests the future of
the internet.111 Property is back from a historical artifact to a work in progress.
And the traditional metaphors in the property professor’s arsenal—the sticks in
the bundle, relatively of title, the role of alienability, the relationships between

108. 277 A.2d 369 (1971). For an example of the use of the case in traditional texts, see
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 87-93 (pairing the case with Moore).
109. GLANCY, supra note 47, at 90. For a different view of Shack, see sources cited at
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 96-97.
110. Glancy’s materials, unlike my exegesis, do not end with adverse possession. She
includes sections on co-ownership of intellectual property, title to intellectual property,
intellectual property licenses and regulatory takings of intellectual property that can be integrated
into the rest of the course.
111. Carol Rose observes: “Private property has long been associated with gloomy images—
the rapaciousness of various Robber Barons on the one hand, the musty casuistry of future
interests and the Rule Against Perpetuities on the other. But in the late twentieth century,
property seems blessed with a bright, perhaps even glamorous future.” Rose, supra note 38, at
129.
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rights and markets, and the balance between the encouraging investment and
exacerbating transactions costs—dominate discussions in Silicon Valley as
well as the academy. Glancy’s materials, which systematize and expand the
materials now finding their way into many property texts, provide a
comprehensive introduction to intellectual property—and to the timeless issues
that have always made property law a foundation of the curriculum.

